

**NATIONAL GUARD HOMELAND DEFENSE DIVISION
FILLING THE GAP IN WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION DEFENSE**

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Melvin G. Spiese
United States Marine Corps**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 98-99

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19991109 068

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY <i>(Leave blank)</i>	2. REPORT DATE 27 May 1999	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE National Guard Homeland Defense Division Filling the Gap in Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTCOL Melvin G. Spiese, USMC			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT <i>(Maximum 200 words)</i> SEE ATTACHED			
14. SUBJECT TERMS		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 56	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel Melvin G. Spiese

Title of Monograph: *National Guard Homeland Defense Division Filling the Gap
In Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense*

Approved by:

William J. Gregor
William J. Gregor, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Robin P. Swan
LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 27th Day of May 1999

Accepted this 26th day of May 1999

ABSTRACT

National Guard Homeland Defense Divisions, Filling the Gap in Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense, by Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Spiese, USMC, 46 pages.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a new and significant threat to American security. The nation does not presently possess the ability to adequately deal with this threat. Congress has tasked DoD to develop capabilities to deal with this threat. In particular, DoD has undertaken programs to train those who will initially respond to a WMD attack (preparedness) and to form units with technical WMD skills to assist in a larger federal relief effort (response).

DoD's present concept for preparedness and response is not adequate to provide a long-term, comprehensive defense. The preparedness program has a narrow focus and ignores necessary refresher training. The DoD response does little more than add small technical units to the current disaster relief (DR) structure. DR is an ad hoc organizational response that cannot react quickly to a WMD incident. The DR structure is composed of units dispersed throughout DoD components and commands, and responsible to different authorities.

The National Guard can, if properly structured, provide genuine WMD homeland defense. Its inherent strengths and characteristics make it the force of choice for this mission. Its integration with state agencies makes it a model for civil-military interagency cooperation, and its infrastructure is a well positioned base to establish a comprehensive WMD defense throughout the nation.

The National Guard should be tasked with the WMD homeland defense mission. It should reorganize the two combat divisions and separate brigades not apportioned to current war plans into two Homeland Defense (HLD) Divisions. The HLD divisions should replace the two Response Task Forces presently established by US Army Forces Command to manage the consequences of a WMD attack. They should be organized, trained and equipped specifically for WMD consequence management, and should become responsible for all military support operations within their regions.

WMD homeland defense is a strategic opportunity for the National Guard. The security of the nation and its ability to respond to disasters, natural and manmade, will be enhanced by the National Guard's return to its roots with a legitimate and comprehensive homeland defense. National Guard relevance and utility well into the next century may depend on how it responds to this opportunity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction.....	1
The Current Process for Consequence Management.....	5
Consequence Management Capabilities Assessment.....	13
The National Guard Homeland Defense Division.....	28
Benefits, Conclusions, and Recommendations.....	41
Endnotes.....	44
Bibliography.....	47

I. INTRODUCTION

There is growing awareness in the United States that the nation is vulnerable to adversarial threats not encountered in many generations. The US homeland has not been vulnerable to direct military attack of any significance since the early 19th Century. Although vulnerable to Soviet strategic attack during the Cold War, a comprehensive nuclear deterrent gave the impression of invulnerability. A direct threat to the US homeland has emerged since the end of the Cold War with the development of sophisticated technologies and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The President highlighted the threat in his National Security Strategy report:

“...easy access to sophisticated technology means the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as WMD or information attacks, to threaten our citizens, and critical national infrastructures...”¹

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated this concern in the National Military Strategy:

“...the security environment we face includes threats to our country and our interests that are not “war” in the classical sense, and yet may call for military forces. Terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trafficking and other threats at home... require the use of military forces...”²

There is an acknowledged problem, but there are also difficulties in addressing the threat.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense Panel (NDP) identified a host of threats to America: information warfare, terrorism, WMD, and international crime, including trafficking in arms, strategic materials and drugs.³ Additionally, the Defense Science Board (DSB) observed in its 1997 study of

transnational threats, a proclivity by terrorists towards greater acts of violence.⁴ The ease by which illicit drugs, illegal immigrants, and other illegal goods move through America's borders provide stark examples of vulnerability to non-traditional threats.⁵

Although neither the Department of Defense (DoD) nor the Joint Staff have established an authoritative definition of homeland defense, the Center for Army Analysis Homeland Defense Initiative workshop has produced a working definition that meets the needs of this paper:

*Protecting (the) United States' territory and citizens from all enemies both foreign and domestic by deterring and when required defending against strategic attack, supporting civil authorities for crisis management in the event of national emergency, supporting civil authorities in consequence response/management with regards to weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring the availability, integrity, survivability and adequacy of critical national assets.*⁶

While providing a homeland defense will require action by all government agencies from local to federal levels, there are significant aspects that can be accomplished by the Armed Forces. Within that context, military requirements encompass a wide range of capabilities across the entire force-- active, reserve and civilian. There are, however, several aspects of the definition of homeland defense that are most properly suited for the National Guard.

Consequence management (CQM) is ultimately a civil responsibility, however it is recognized DoD will play a significant role in a comprehensive response plan. The National Guard has been identified as the lead DoD agency to deal with consequence management. The NDP and DSB recommended assignment of CQM responsibilities to

National Guard units.⁷ The QDR, the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress on roles and missions, assigned the National Guard the role of countering chemical and biological terrorism.⁸ The QDR viewed countering chemical and biological terrorism as an extension of the National Guard's traditional role of providing military support to civil authorities (MSCA). The National Guard's role as the DoD lead agency for MSCA having been codified in DoD policy.⁹

The threat of terrorist attack with WMD has created the greatest concern for homeland defense. The recent attacks against the World Trade Center and Murrah Federal Building, added to the Auhm Shinrikyo Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway and world-wide proliferation of WMD materials and technology, has prompted renewed government action to provide an adequate defense for the homeland.

The WMD threat is complex. Its magnitude requires a variety of governmental actions to prevent and limit the scope and consequences of any incident. Existing federal, state, civil and military agencies and organizations have capabilities relevant to meeting the threat, but the structure and authority of these organizations were established to meet other public service needs. Defense in response to terrorist use of WMD has two components: pre-employment actions to prevent use, or crisis management, and post-employment activities to mitigate the damage caused by use, or consequence management. There is an awareness that the nation lacks the capability to deal adequately with the consequences of WMD incident.

WMD are a broad range of weapons requiring a corresponding broad range of capabilities to deal with their consequences. An attack can range from a persistent

chemical agent incorporated into a large explosive device, to a covert biological agent release with an incubation period to confuse the time and origin of attack. Other variations, such as a short duration contaminant used in a confined location, or a persistent agent that will easily spread and propagate contamination and casualties will alter the response significantly. The nature of the attack, such as an act of terrorism under peacetime conditions, or an asymmetric attack during mobilization, with DoD resources dispersed or deployed outside of the US, will affect the ability to respond.

This paper will focus on issues related to the National Guard's ability to effectively undertake CQM as part of homeland defense. CQM is a state and local responsibility, yet only the federal government is capable of maintaining many of the capabilities necessary to effectively manage the response to a WMD attack. Congress has passed guiding legislation and DoD has established policies to that end. DoD's plan for CQM is built ostensibly on its current method of providing MSCA for disaster relief (DR). That plan will be assessed against WMD planning scenarios used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DoD, and other requirements already identified for CQM. Assumptions, fallacies and shortfalls in the current CQM model will be identified. A National Guard Homeland Defense (HLD) Division, specifically tailored to meet the requirements of WMD CQM, will be proposed as a solution to capability shortfalls. Functions, authorities and responsibilities, organizational structure, and actions necessary for implementation of such a proposal will be presented. Benefits of a National Guard HLD division, conclusions, and recommendations will complete the paper.

II. THE CURRENT PROCESS FOR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

The Nature of Consequence Management

Response to any WMD attack must be timely. To provide a swift, appropriate response, the weapon's effects must be rapidly and accurately identified. A good initial assessment permits response teams to contain the effects and relieve associated suffering. A WMD incident is expected to quickly overwhelm many civil systems, such as medical treatment, transportation, fire and rescue, and undermine public order. WMD attacks may force large scale evacuations, adding to the complexity of the problem, and may contaminate water, food, the air, and large tracts of land. Suffering will probably be intensive and extensive, and some attacks will have long term physical and psychological effects. The resultant wide spread fear and psychological difficulties associated with the physical damage and injuries will have significant impact on the nature and extent of a response. Accordingly, managing the consequences of a WMD attack is likely to be a complex and massive operation.

Local and state authorities have responsibility for emergency management within their jurisdictions. Their resources and capabilities are generally limited and can easily be overwhelmed by either the severity of the emergency, or by the extent of a disaster. The federal government, principally through the Stafford Emergency Assistance Act, stands ready to provide assistance when catastrophe overwhelms state capabilities.¹⁰

Federal assistance requires presidential authorization, and FEMA is responsible for coordinating the federal response, to include military support provided to civil authorities.¹¹ Organized geographically in ten regions throughout the US, FEMA

possesses no resources of its own. However, it provides planning, and coordinates and controls federal resources employed in support of state authorities.¹²

FEMA has published a federal response plan (FRP), that guides federal actions in support of local and state emergency management. An annex to the plan to deal with the terrorist use of WMD has also been developed in response to Congressional direction. The plan identifies 12 emergency support functions (ESF) essential to providing effective assistance. FEMA provides the ESF staffs and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) during a federal relief operation. The plan tasks DoD to provide emergency assistance when civil capabilities are overwhelmed.¹³ FEMA's 1997 Report to the President validated the ESFs for CQM incident to a federal response to WMD terrorism, and the FRP remains the basis for federal action in a WMD incident.¹⁴ DoD possesses significant resources for providing such assistance and figures prominently in the 12 ESFs and FRP,¹⁵ particularly when responding to WMD.

Controlling the extent of a WMD attack depends heavily upon the quality of the initial assessment and response. Immediate response must assess the nature and extent of the incident. The initial assessment must determine the latent risk, damage, potential for expansion, and number and type of causalities. Those assessments serve to identify the order and type of capabilities required immediately. Initial actions will seek to limit the damage, contain the effects, neutralize the threat, and ameliorate the suffering. Widespread contamination or blast effects will create large areas that cannot be transited or inhabited. Those areas will need to be isolated and the resident populations evacuated. The evacuation will produce a homeless population needing all life's essentials. Search and rescue is required to locate casualties and victims. Immediate personnel

decontamination and mass casualty handling and evacuation will be required to deal with casualties. Other tasks of significant magnitude include point and area decontamination and cleanup, and establishment of essential services. Recent disaster relief operations, like that of Hurricane Andrew, provide examples of the scale and variety of services needed. The military portion of the response will be massive. Moreover, coordinating the numerous federal and state agencies who provide additional capabilities and services make these operations large and complicated.

Although DR is essentially a civil responsibility involving many levels of government, only DoD can practically field and maintain the capabilities required to mitigate the consequences of a WMD attack. Accordingly, Congress designated DoD as the lead agency for developing domestic preparedness and response, and directed establishment of rapid response capabilities for detection, neutralization, containment, and disposal of WMD.¹⁶ The NDP identified domestic preparedness and managing the consequences of WMD as an area where DoD should expand its activities regarding homeland defense.¹⁷

Military forces are normally used to meet immediate needs and usually used for a short period when participating in DR operations, “last in, first out” being the guiding principle. The military support mission is gradually transferred to civil authorities for execution of long term recovery. Transfer occurs only after civil capabilities are mobilized and able to handle the situation.

Government and DoD Initiatives

Effective CQM requires preparation-- consisting of doctrine, organization, training, equipment and planning; and response-- the ability to efficiently put the plan into

effect. The Congress, in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 Defense Authorization Act, made a number of findings relating to the lack of preparedness and ability to deal with a WMD incident at all levels of government.¹⁸ The NDP and DSB published similar findings in their reports. Congress went further and directed specific actions to address a number of those issues in this and subsequent authorizations.¹⁹

Congress assigned DoD as the lead government agency for both preparedness and response to WMD attack through the FY 1997 Defense Authorization. That statute also directed DoD to establish a rapid response team to assist federal, state and local agencies with the detection, neutralization, containment and disposal of WMD. It further directed DoD to conduct CQM-related training throughout the nation for local civil agencies who would be the first to respond to such an incident.²⁰

As a result of congressional action, DoD has undertaken a number of specific initiatives to address the requirements established by law. More significantly, DoD has begun to form units and develop specific capabilities to respond to a WMD incident, with the majority of the action taking place in the National Guard and reserves. The Army's Soldier and Biological and Chemical Defense Command has established a Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C-B/RRT). US Army Forces Command has directed each of the two Continental US Armies to establish response task forces (RTF) in their geographic regions.²¹ Of significance is the establishment of 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) detachments, redesignated as Military Support Detachments (MSD), assigned within each FEMA region to assist first responders in the determination of the nature and extent of a WMD incident.²² The FY 1999 authorization provides funds for an additional, though less robust, 44 MSD (light) elements to ensure national

coverage. Additionally, the US Army Reserve Command includes 10 Regional Support Commands (RSC) which coincide with FEMA's 10 regions. Each RSC has established liaison cells at each corresponding FEMA regional headquarters, with an Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) permanently assigned.²³

With 54 different states and territories having ultimate jurisdiction for emergency response, there is no single model for CQM. In general, CQM responsibility resides in the state emergency management office, or its equivalent. States incorporate the MSDs for initial assessment and plan for the execution of emergency response procedures with local first responders, public contracts for private firms to provide particular emergency needs (water, shelter, hazardous waste removal, etc.), and the use of state National Guard units. The states are responsible for coordinating with the FCO and employment of federal assistance, and supervising the overall execution of relief and recovery efforts.

DoD Policy for Consequence Management

Preparedness and response to WMD is analogous to missions encompassed under military support to civil authorities, already codified in statute and policy. Response to WMD must be consistent with the concepts and responsibilities established for other domestic emergencies.²⁴ MSCA, principally support for DR, has become the present model for CQM with heavy reliance on Reserve Component (RC) forces. DR capabilities are combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) intensive and are predominantly resident in the National Guard and Army Reserve. The National Guard, established in policy as the DoD lead in MSCA, has taken on a prominent role in CQM.

National Guard forces belong to their governors under Title 32, US Code, and can be employed as determined by the governor. Title 32 use, though, is at state expense. The National Guard can be federalized by the president under Title 10, US Code, and can then be employed as the National Command Authorities (NCA) would any active or reserve forces. Under Title 10, the federal government funds Guard operations, though their actions are then governed by the same statutes and policies which govern federal use of the military in the US.

Under present DR directives, requests for military support are made to the Secretary of Defense by FEMA, in response to requests from state authorities. The Secretary of the Army is the DoD executive agent, exercising those responsibilities through the Director of Military Support (DOMS). Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, the DCO may control the entire DoD effort. Under catastrophic circumstances, a disaster RTF (DRTF) will likely be activated and employed to manage DoD operations. Once approved, units are assigned predicated upon the nature of the disaster, and capability and availability of units.

Military support for CQM is coordinated by a DCO directly with the Federal Coordinating Officer in accordance with the FRP. The DCO, with the FCO and state/local civil authorities, determine required military resources and capabilities. CQM support operations are conducted by an RTF, which exercises command and control over all federal military forces employed: Active, Reserve, and federalized National Guard.

The RTF is not a standing organization. It is activated by the NCA upon notification of a WMD incident requiring military support. Plans have been developed to activate the RTF quickly, with procedures to effectively accept and employ assigned

units. Though not a standing organization, functional elements are listed as part of a notional RTF structure. Units possessing unique WMD skills, such as the Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU), and Marine Corps Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), are assigned by name (see figure 1). Other units are determined by the requirements of the incident, unit capability, and unit availability. The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office (COMPIO) identifies and makes RC units available.




FIGURE 1

The principle guidance for RC coordinated action is encompassed in the “DoD Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks using Weapons of Mass Destruction” (NG/RC Integration Plan). The plan is the basis for establishing the MSD elements, and establishes the COMPIO to provide a variety of functions related to the employment of RC forces in a WMD response.²⁵

The COMPIO directs WMD-related training and doctrine for reserve and Guard units. It also identifies assets and capabilities needed in a particular incident, and integrates and coordinates selection of appropriate reserve and Guard units to provide them. These units and others needed to meet situational requirements are expected to be federalized and assigned to a RTF in response to a WMD incident.

III. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT

Studies and Assessments

The critical first step in developing a comprehensive CQM capability is the determination of requirements. There is no single authoritative reference for CQM requirements. There have been, however, efforts in this direction, albeit focused specifically upon the agency conducting the assessment and that agency's own particular needs. Accordingly, it is necessary to review a number of assessments and studies to identify those capabilities required for CQM.

Presidential Decision Directive-39 directed FEMA to assess federal capabilities to respond to WMD terrorism.²⁶ The NG/RC Integration Plan provided a requirements and capabilities assessment as the basis for determining National Guard and reserve support for CQM.²⁷ The current Defense Planning Guidance provided a domestic WMD terrorism Illustrative Planning Scenario (IPS). The IPS was used by the Department of the Army in a Mission Task Organization Force assessment.²⁸ The National Guard Bureau was directed by House Resolution 2266 to conduct an extensive assessment of National Guard CQM capabilities.²⁹ There have also been a number of other studies that evaluate National Guard capabilities for disaster relief and that clarify the DoD baseline for CQM.

All of the assessments and studies had different purposes, and differed in substance. Numerous critical aspects of DoD capabilities were not studied, however, making the overall assessment incomplete. Nonetheless, together they provide reasonable assessment of requirements, and in some cases capabilities and shortfalls, for CQM.

These studies can help determine whether effective, efficient CQM can be provided by the current DoD model. In particular, these studies are useful for determining National Guard capabilities and evaluating current structure. Shortfalls in the studies, which must be considered in order to develop a comprehensive WMD response, will be identified as the studies are presented.

FEMA's assessment of federal CQM capabilities dealt with the execution of the FRP. FEMA assessed federal CQM capabilities against the 12 emergency support functions during five different scenarios. The incidents provided no notice and overwhelmed local and state resources. The assessment assumed that *DoD capabilities would be available*. The scenarios were:

- Plutonium dispersion by explosion in a metropolitan area
- Detonation of a small improvised nuclear device
- Anthrax release in a metropolitan airport ventilation system
- Non-persistent nerve agent release in a subway system
- Persistent nerve agent dispersed by explosion in a metropolitan airport

The scenarios included mass fatalities and casualties, but did not include long term or wide spread critical infrastructure damage or contamination, area contamination, destruction, or evacuation.

The assessment focused on the coordination of federal assistance and support within the ESFs at the federal agency coordination level. It did not address the requirements to conduct the actual CQM actions associated with the attacks, but a number of general requirements can be gleaned from the assessment:

- Technical knowledge and skills for the identification of agents and the area of contamination, particularly nuclear/radiological
- Decontamination of areas and buildings
- Isolation/quarantine of effected areas
- Technical knowledge of large scale WMD disaster management

- Mass casualty handling and mortuary affairs
- Mass decontamination of patients and people
- Medical shelter and treatment for contaminated casualties

The assessment did not assess DoD support of the ESFs. DoD's ability to activate the RTF, identify and mobilize appropriate units, deploy to a crisis location, and conduct effective command and control of an ad hoc organization in a high stress, time critical environment are critical to effectively support the ESFs.

The NG/RC Integration Plan used the US Government Interagency CONPLAN for Combating Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (November 10, 1997 Draft) to identify appropriate DoD tasks, and grouped them to correspond with the FRP emergency support functions. After consultation with the Services, the DoD plan identified capabilities needed to respond to a WMD incident, and identified those capabilities that were lacking. The plan sought to address those shortfalls, in part, by specifying the use of the National Guard and reserve units to fill gaps.³⁰

In addition to the MSDs, the plan addressed particular critical needs and directed each Army National Guard and Reserve chemical company to establish a platoon-size element for NBC reconnaissance. The same Army units, along with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Medical Patient Decontamination Teams are also required to establish platoon-size elements for patient decontamination. The plan identifies additional requirements expected in the larger response for a WMD incident: security, mass care (shelter, food, emergency first aid bulk distribution of emergency relief items), engineering support and transportation (ground, fixed wing and rotary wing).³¹ Units are not identified and no specific consequence management-related training is directed for these latter functions.

The NG/RC Integration plan has determined a number of necessary functions for CQM through its assessment of National Guard and reserve unit applicability:

- Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) reconnaissance
- Information and planning
- Patient decontamination
- Medical:
 - NBC medical response/ triage/ trauma/ preventive medicine/ stress management
- Security/law enforcement
- Mortuary affairs
- Communications
- Engineer:
 - Emergency clearance/ temporary construction/ emergency restoration of critical public services/ emergency demolition and stabilization/ technical damage assessment
- Transportation:
 - Fixed and rotary wing aviation/ ground
- Mass care:
 - Shelter/ food/ first aid/ bulk distribution of emergency relief

The assessment did not specifically address mass casualty decontamination, care, handling or evacuation, nor area quarantine or decontamination which are essential for comprehensive CQM. There are, however, units in the Guard and reserves which can readily perform those tasks.

The Defense Planning Guidance used a single scenario as a baseline for military requirements for CQM. The scenario was limited to a non-persistent nerve agent attack in the Washington DC and New York subway systems, with 1,500 and 2,000 casualties respectively. The scenario emphasized mass casualties, the inability of civil agencies to treat contaminated patients, and indicated the possibility of civil unrest. The Department of the Army Mission Task Organization Force assessment process produced a requirement task organization incorporating the following functions: aviation, chemical, engineer, medical, transportation, military police, signal, and infantry. The single

scenario is far too narrow and limited to determine comprehensive requirements. However, the functions addressed are appropriate for general consideration of CQM requirements.

Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was contracted to conduct the National Guard Bureau study. The detailed study included extensive interviews and several conferences with Guardsmen and others involved in CQM. SAIC based its assessment on ten scenarios consisting of extensive, catastrophic WMD attacks. The study determined 47 missions consistent with roles for the National Guard that readily translated into requirements. The following are excerpted as applicable for determining an appropriate CQM organization:

- Assist state and local emergency planners
- Provide emergency/fixed medical assets
- Augment mortuary/graves registration services
- Augment National Guard State Area Commands with chemical and biological reconnaissance, assessment and monitoring capability
- Aerial sampling and reconnaissance
- Support urban search and rescue
- Assist mass evacuation operations
- Augment local law enforcement support
- Support the establishment and maintenance of the Joint Operations Center
- Personal and equipment decontamination
- Support shelter management
- Provide air and ground transportation support
- Provide and employ specialized equipment
- Civil engineer support
- Conduct WMD response training with state emergency management agencies

The study viewed CQM as a new task, not a new mission for the Guard. It did not consider organization, command and control, or unit/capability distribution throughout the nation. The study did address the need to consider force structure allotment regarding new and improved capabilities.

Several additional assessments have been conducted focused specifically on disaster relief. DR is the foundation for CQM. Thus, these assessments assist in clarifying the DoD baseline for CQM. Detailed studies conducted by Rand Corporation and the National Academy for Public Administration (NAPA) provide insight into DR requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls.

The RAND study was a Congressionally directed assessment of National Guard state and federal missions, conducted for DoD. The NAPA study was contracted by FEMA to assess National Guard roles in emergency response and preparedness. RAND identified the following as desired capabilities in a 1993 study of Army roles in DR:³²

- Special Skills:
 - Transportation (Helicopters, off-road vehicles)
 - Urban search and rescue
 - Mobile hospitals
 - Surveillance and reconnaissance
 - Radiation monitoring
 - Situation assessment
 - Damage assessment
- Communications:
 - Equipment and trained personnel
- Organized forces:
 - Equipment and disciplined personnel

The NAPA study did not identify requirements per se, however, it made a recommendation that units with the following capabilities be assigned to each state: transportation, medical, engineer, aviation, maintenance, and military police.³³ The National Guard has had a similar long-standing objective for a distributed capability force structure.³⁴

All of these studies were based on the present RTF response model; none considered organization, collective planning and preparation, coordination with civil authorities, activation, deployment, nor command and control.

A compilation of the identified actions and functions, and a review of the scenarios provides insight into other needs and offers a general set of CQM requirements:

- Detailed planning, coordination, and training with civil authorities
- First responder training
- Technical and response management advice
- Reconnaissance, detection, identification and assessment of effects
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
- Mass casualty and NBC medical handling and treatment
- Mass decontamination of patients, people, equipment, facilities and areas
- Communications support- internal to DoD elements, and for critical emergency managers/civil authorities
- Engineering- clearing, expedient construction and restoration of vital services
- Transportation
- Mass care- mortuary, evacuation, shelter, sustenance, and distribution of relief supplies
- Security and quarantine assistance

Additional requirements to facilitate activation, deployment, command and control, and internal support are essential for a comprehensive CQM capability.

It is necessary to consider the DoD and federal capacity to provide these functions under any national security conditions, the ability to provide them under civil rather than battlefield conditions, and consider activation, deployment, and command and control to determine if this model is adequate.

Current Capabilities

DoD has specifically developed several units and capabilities, and directed enhancements for other units, to meet particular CQM requirements.³⁵ With these limited

exceptions, a WMD response is drawn from the larger military structure. 1st and 5th Army headquarters provide the nucleus of the RTF headquarters. They are augmented by active, reserve and National Guard personnel as the situation requires. DCOs are provided by Army Training Readiness Brigades throughout 1st and 5th Army regions as additional responsibilities. EPLOs are reserve officers assigned to FEMA regional headquarters, activated once a month for training.³⁶

The C-B/RRT is a task organized response element providing technical expertise and advice. It possesses no organic CQM capability, but has links and reach-back capability to labs and other technical agencies. It can be augmented by TEU and 52d EOD.³⁷ TEU is primarily associated with crisis management. Its focus is chemical or biological agent/weapon identification, assessment, and rendering those weapons safe. It has a limited decontamination capability. TEU has three Chemical-Biological Response Teams posted throughout the US, and are capable of rapid world-wide deployment. The 52d EOD is organized into four battalions totaling 37 companies throughout the US. It is trained to deactivate US and foreign military ordnance and complex explosive devices, as well as chemical and nuclear special improvised explosive devices.³⁸

CBIRF is a 350 man force that conducts agent reconnaissance and classification, treats and decontaminates patients and personnel, and provides technical CQM advice. It can handle up to 500 patients with various injuries. It is a rapidly deployable, provides its own support and security, and has a limited EOD capability.

The MSD provides WMD assessment. Ten MSDs are full time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) under Title 32 US Code. As such, they are state assets, though they are designed to be regional responders. The 44 MSDs (light) now being established in the

remaining states and territories will be in traditional Guard status, with composition, capability, and availability determined by the respective governor.³⁹

The NG/RC Integration Plan directed actions for Reserve Component units to enhance CQM capabilities beyond those outlined for the MSDs:

- Each chemical company will establish an NBC recon platoon
- Each chemical company will establish NBC patient decontamination platoons, along with Air Guard and Air Force Reserve Patient Decontamination Teams to a capacity of 12 patients per hour
- Triage, trauma, stress management and preventive medicine elements will be established. Triage elements are to have a capacity of 100 patients per hour

The Reserve Components will have 54 NBC reconnaissance and 127 patient decontamination elements trained through FY 2000. The plan identified other functions necessary for a more comprehensive WMD response, but no units or CQM related skills were identified, limiting available CQM capabilities to those already presented.

Significant augmentation from a variety of RC and active forces will be necessary to provide all of the functions necessary for a comprehensive WMD response. Forces will be drawn from the larger DoD structure to augment those units with specific CQM skills. These forces are likely to be trained and organized for general conventional combat. Units will be determined at the time of the event, and done in consultation with the Program Integration Office, Director of Military Support, US Atlantic Command, and Forces Command. The RTFs will respond to WMD incidents as an ad hoc organization with many units having no affiliation with the RTFs or particular CQM skills.

Fallacies and Assumptions

The aforementioned studies and assessments present a number of critical shortfalls and fallacies in CQM capabilities and assumptions. Other sources present additional considerations dealing with CQM requirements and capabilities.

The underlying assumption for DoD participation in CQM is that a WMD incident is sufficiently similar to other disasters, particularly natural, to enable the current process for DR to be employed with only limited enhancements. Although there are a number of valid natural disaster scenarios which reasonably replicate WMD scenarios, they do not include all WMD scenarios and do not consider worst case events. The present CQM model is built predominantly on a single event of clearly defined and contained effects. This model is inadequate as a comprehensive CQM baseline because of the greater magnitude of destruction and casualties, shorter time period for destruction and response, and potential for expansion and propagation of effects over time in a WMD attack.

Emergency response and disaster relief are reactive, despite pre-planning. Emergencies and disasters are typically “come as you are” events, providing no time for significant adjustments in training or capabilities. This is even more pronounced in time critical events with expanding consequences, as may be expected with WMD. With the exception of the few CQM related units and elements, most of the DoD resources that will be employed possess standard “off the shelf” military capabilities. Many military techniques are battlefield expedients and are not suited for the conditions expected in a homeland WMD attack.⁴⁰ Thus, units supporting CQM will require specialized WMD related skills.

It must also be understood that every decision made by civil authorities is either political or has political ramifications. Public perceptions of the hazard and expectations for relief will weigh heavily on most, if not all, decisions related to the response. The public will expect the response to mitigate suffering quickly. The public fears toxic materials, consequently the response must be rapid, comprehensive and efficient. Civil reliance on military capabilities will make the transfer of response actions from military to civilian agencies difficult decisions. Thus, DoD's role in consequence management quite possibly will be greater than presently anticipated or desired.

From a practical perspective, use of the National Guard may not meet stated expectations. The RAND DR study found Guard forces employed in supplemental roles, rather than being the primary responder in state emergencies. National Guard units within many states were often unable to provide required capabilities during DR operations. Thus, they were assigned labor intensive, rather than military skill-related missions and tasks.⁴¹ Moreover, the Guard's capabilities for state missions were generally incidental to the force at large.⁴² The NAPA study made similar findings, noting that state missions were performed on the margin.⁴³ The result reflects the primacy of the National Guard's federal mission as the Army's combat reserve. That federal mission determines organization and capabilities. DR is, therefore, conducted with forces primarily organized trained and equipped for conventional military operations under battlefield conditions.

Shortfalls

Consequence management requires more than the limited enhancements to disaster relief presently underway. It appears that the WMD-related peculiar needs of disaster relief are met with the establishment of the C-B/RRT, CBIRF, and MSD elements, and specified WMD medical and NBC reconnaissance enhancements for designated Reserve Component units. These current initiatives are insufficient and fall short in many areas. Collectively they do not provide a comprehensive, long term solution for WMD homeland defense.

Additionally, planning to date is considered inadequate at most levels.⁴⁴ Planning is a state and local responsibility, and must account for more than just the few DoD units with CQM specific skills. Planning must address the introduction and incorporation of all expected DoD capabilities in sufficient detail to ensure timely and efficient employment of all critical military assets.

The ad hoc RTF organization resulting from the identification and assignment of units at the occurrence of an event leads to complications in activation, deployment, and employment, despite pre-planning. A WMD attack will require the rapid and efficient movement to the crisis site of elements to contain and mitigate the effects. Efficiency dictates these elements must be familiar with the response plan and each other. Although this is a reasonable expectation for CBIRF or the C-B/RRT, it is difficult to imagine non-CQM specific support forces can be smoothly and effectively integrated into the RTF at the time of the event. This condition is further compounded by critical coordination elements being assigned from different components, responsible to different authorities, and often managing their duties on a part time basis. This may be adequate for DR, but

the model falls short of the expectations for planning, organization, training, responsiveness, and effectiveness normally expected of military forces, and necessary in a WMD response.

Part of the shortfall stems from the lack of a comprehensive strategy, particularly a single authority with responsibility for the direction and integration of all agencies participating in CQM. Moreover, DoD is trying to support its role with minimum disruption to existing structure, or commitment of forces to such a narrow mission.

Reliance on the Reserve Component may prove difficult. The NCA must activate the reserves and they can only be employed under some form of federal control. National Guard forces are tied to their states, unless federalized. Some states have entered into mutual support agreements, enabling state to state support without federal involvement. Absent each state maintaining its own comprehensive CQM capability, a regional response approach is a necessity. Thus, a robust capability with a regional focus and appropriate authorities must be established.

There are additional factors that come into play during national mobilization that can complicate and debilitate homeland defense. CQM relies heavily upon low density, high skill technical units, and other supporting units that will be in great demand. Competition for these limited resources will exhaust available units and rob DoD of important capabilities necessary to meet both homeland defense and military operations. This is particularly serious in the most threatening of scenarios, two near-simultaneous major theater wars. If we accept the threat, and consider reasonable worst cases possibilities, it is clear redundant capabilities will be needed to ensure in-theater support, support during mobilization, and maintain adequate coverage at home.

The current approach is not comprehensive and does not provide for the timely, effective response needed to meet the WMD threat. The capabilities being developed are limited in scope. Current initiatives, with limited exceptions in technical areas, are being developed within existing organizations, and under existing authorities. The majority of a WMD response will be done in a manner similar to any DR effort, rather than a manner recognizing the unique nature of the WMD threat. Although vital and necessary, the DoD capabilities being developed are on the margins of the larger CQM requirement.

Additionally, the actions proposed by DoD to date are disjointed. The structure for WMD response is ill-defined and the responsibilities are split between the active force and both Reserve Components. The programs are controlled and managed through several offices within DoD and standing commands. The technical capabilities being developed within the active forces and National Guard are subordinate to different authorities. The employment of RC units is based on identifying capabilities and units during the incident assessment at the time of attack, and done by a DoD-level integration office with no authority over the units involved. Active forces are expected to make up shortfalls in capabilities determined during this assessment. This is generally acceptable for natural disasters, but inadequate for a WMD event.

The National Guard must develop specific CQM skills in the main, not on the margin if it is to be the primary DoD force for CQM, and if it is to perform in a more effective manner than its current DR capability. Moreover, a balanced distribution of capabilities must be established throughout the US to ensure reasonable regional responsiveness.

Response to a large-scale WMD attack will demand more than the addition of a few newly established units to the present ad hoc DR organization. These are sound first steps, but they are hardly revolutionary changes commensurate with the threat. WMD defense requires a rapid, well-planned, and comprehensive response. It is possible to build a viable WMD homeland defense capability upon what has already been done, but the nature of the WMD threat requires far greater capabilities.

Responsibility, authority and accountability are confused because there is no established organization. Without an established organization the response to a critical WMD event will be delayed. The unique requirements posed by the threat of WMD attack require the creation of an organization integrated into the civil emergency management system, trained and positioned to ensure adequate civil preparedness, and able to efficiently respond to these incidents.

IV The National Guard Homeland Defense Division

A Call for a Dedicated Homeland Defense Organization

DoD's efforts have not been adequate to meet its own stated objective, or the expectations of other agencies, to respond to WMD attacks. DoD is building its capability on standing organizations and structure while making limited organizational changes in technical areas. This approach will not produce the capability needed to meet the requirements and public expectations for an effective response to a WMD event.

The expansion of technical capabilities encompassed in the TEU, C-B/RRT, CBIRF, and MSDs, and the taskings encompassed in the NG/RC Integration Plan, are conceptually sound and if achieved will meet immediate national needs. These capabilities, however, do not meet the larger national security requirements posed by the WMD threat. Current CQM capabilities are dispersed throughout the military components and under disparate authorities. The other essential capabilities needed to deal with the WMD threat are similarly organized or do not exist. This present model is an impediment to the development of a comprehensive and extensive response to meet this threat over the long run. Additionally, competition for access to, and control of, these limited resources during a national mobilization will produce confusion and delay, while leaving significant portions of the US or major military commands at risk.

To provide the effective, comprehensive WMD homeland defense expected by the American public, there must be significant changes to the current organizations and plans. A comprehensive homeland defense structure should build upon current initiatives to the

maximum degree feasible, but not avoid revolutionary changes that can better meet the needs of national security strategy.

The National Guard- The Right Choice

The National Guard is the force of choice for a comprehensive WMD homeland defense. The Guard's traditional structure is a community based, regionally organized force that currently owns over 16,000 facilities. It is integrated into state emergency management systems, has close relationships with civil authorities, and has a record of detailed emergency planning.

The National Guard, by design and tradition, provides a unique force that is immediately available and is linked to civil authorities for responsive domestic employment. It is a model of civil-military, inter-agency cooperation. More significantly, the National Guard is the most palatable military force that can be tasked for primary employment within the confines of the US. The National Guard can provide comprehensive WMD homeland defense throughout the nation, but the Guard requires major structural adjustments to ensure it possesses the necessary authorities, organization, and capabilities.

In this era of constrained resources it is understood that organizational adjustments to force structure will be expensive. However, the Guard has structure available that can be converted for homeland defense (HLD) divisions without affecting the Guard's wartime mission or support to the Total Army. National Guard combat structure currently consists of 15 enhanced readiness brigades, eight combat divisions, two separate brigades and one scout group. After war plan apportionment and Total

Army redesign agreements, two combat divisions and two separate brigades remain non-apportioned for contingency plans and are considered a “strategic reserve”.⁴⁵ The two divisions and brigades not required for current war plans can be used to establish HLD divisions.

Authorities, Responsibilities and Functions

WMD homeland defense will be multi-level and cover all aspects of CQM and DR requirements. The HLD division will be responsible for the preparedness of first responders, and for planning and responding to a WMD incident within its geographic region. The division will be able to provide inter-state support for state managed emergencies without federal involvement if it is incorporated under a regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The division will be responsible for coordination between subordinate units and states in accordance with the EMAC. It will establish standing liaison with each state area command (STARC) and regional FEMA headquarters. The HLD division will be the MSCA link to DOMS and FORSCOM.

The STARC will maintain its authority over assigned National Guard forces within their states, including those assigned to the HLD divisions. It will coordinate and conduct first responder training and other actions envisioned for WMD preparedness, and develop state plans for WMD consequence management. STARCs will continue to provide command and control over state Guard units employed internally, and will provide the State Coordinating Officer to accept forces being provided from the associated HDL division to support state managed emergencies. STARCs will exercise

command and control over MSD elements; however, the MSDs will provide simultaneous reports to their division headquarters to expedite unit mobilization.

At the next higher level, HLD divisions will be responsible for regional planning support to each STARC and the FEMA regional headquarters. The division will provide liaison officers and command and control links to each STARC and the FEMA headquarters within their regions. Under the provisions of the EMAC, the division will initiate actions and execute plans based on initial reports from the MSDs, beginning with the initial response to a WMD incident. The HLD division will provide the DCO⁴⁶ and provide command and control over all military support flowing in from outside the region, Reserve and Active Component forces alike.

The HLD division commander will be responsible to DOMS and FORSCOM for managing DoD support in a federal response. If the HLD division and its headquarters are used in that role, the units responsible for military support will be familiar with all agencies in the region, will have visibility to all division and incoming federal resources, and will be intimate with emergency plans. The division will also be responsible for coordinating and employing its resources to support states within in its region during state emergencies. This new command and control arrangement ensures responsiveness, thoroughness, continuity, and familiarity as emergency situations develop. The division will also be responsible for coordinating missions assigned to its units from federal authorities. This would include forming task forces with headquarters elements for missions outside of its region, including overseas deployments.

The Homeland Defense Division

Two HLD divisions can be established to coincide with, and replace, the two RTFs presently established by 1st and 5th Armies. These divisions encompass the same FEMA regions as the RTFs. The HLD division's mission will be:

To support and defend the US homeland (all states and territories) from attack or sabotage by enemies both foreign and domestic, and respond to such attacks, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters that may overwhelm civil authorities; and work with federal, state and local civil agencies to contain and limit effects, mitigate loss of life and suffering, and maintain or restore government infrastructure and essential services.

It will be capable of training, planning and liaison prior to, and command and control after attack.

The Homeland Defense Division Model




FIGURE 2

Figure 2 depicts the organization of the HLD division. The division is designed along the standard model for Army divisions. It will be built around 3 HLD maneuver brigades, each composed of an MP, heavy engineer, and chemical battalion. The aviation brigade, medical brigade, and division support command (DISCOM) will provide the maneuver brigades other capabilities immediately required for CQM. HLD brigades will be organized geographically within the division's region, with a corresponding responsibility to respond within that geographic area.

An aviation brigade, consisting of three rotary wing lift battalions and a battalion of small fixed wing aircraft provide tactical mobility. The brigade will also be able to move reconnaissance and assessment teams, and deploy critical command, control, and CQM capabilities. The DISCOM will be specifically structured to support homeland defense. Forward and main support battalions (FSB/MSB) will provide direct support to the maneuver brigades. The division possesses the medical capabilities that were repeatedly identified in the studies as seriously lacking. Separate battalions and companies round out a broad range of required CQM capabilities for the division.

The aviation brigade, medical brigade, DISCOM, and separate battalions are structured to facilitate habitual relationships with the maneuver brigades. They will be organized in manner that coincides with maneuver brigade geographic areas. The size, strength, and structure of the division, both in manpower and units, will facilitate distributed capability force structure. This will allow for some immediate emergency action within the state, while facilitating a rapid geographic response. The division's strength will also allow solid regional reinforcement, national coverage by one division in

the event of activation of the other, and packaged deployable capabilities for theater support requirements in their secondary wartime role.

HLD Division Headquarters, and Command and Control

The HLD division headquarters will be unique within the Army. It will consolidate responsibility and authority, and establish extensive liaison, encompassing many of the functions currently existing in a multitude of DoD agencies. Figure 3 depicts command, administrative and liaison relationships.




FIGURE 3

The division will be responsible to the National Guard Bureau and DOMS for coordination and administration. It will report to FORSCOM for DR operations and USACOM for CQM, as currently established for the RTFs. The headquarters will establish permanent liaison with all included FEMA regional headquarters, and provide the DCO upon activation to support FEMA in a federal response.

Permanent liaison will be similarly established with each STARC to facilitate planning, training and support for both state emergencies and federal responses. MSDs are assigned to states under Title 32, but will be organized under the division NBC reconnaissance battalion to ensure standardization, consistency in operations, and facilitate MSD-division coordinated actions.

STARCs maintain Title 32 authority over units assigned to their states; however, those same units are organized into larger tactical formations within the division. The division will exercise Title 10 authority over subordinate units when federalized, and Title 10-like authority under the regional EMAC to support states within the region at that level.

The division will activate forces in accordance with standing plans (regional, state and local) and as warranted by the situation. The headquarters will also provide command elements, appropriately organized and augmented, for division task forces directed by the NCA for deployment outside of the division's region. Deployments overseas in response to a WMD incident, or in support of military operations, will be conducted under the division's Title 10 authority, to include task forces below the division level.

HDL Maneuver and Aviation Brigades




FIGURE 4

HLD maneuver brigade headquarters will also be unique within the Army. The brigades must function under Title 32 (regional EMAC) and Title 10 authorities, and have familiarity and effective relationships with the associated STARCs and FEMA headquarters, similar to the division. The brigade headquarters must provide advice to local and state authorities. There is no requirement that the brigade be commanded by an officer of any particular occupational specialty; however, the commander and staff must be effective in planning and command and control of all military related CQM capabilities under any WMD circumstance.

Domestic police-like functions are the most sensitive actions undertaken by the military and are the single greatest cause for apprehension. Nonetheless, MP battalions are essential for homeland defense operations. It will be necessary to isolate areas and


control movement under most circumstances. MPs will be needed during overseas deployment to a crisis site to provide security and force protection.

A heavy engineer and chemical battalion will complete the maneuver brigade. The engineer battalion will emphasize construction, but will also have bridging and dump truck companies. Activation of brigade forces will be done in the same manner as the division, and will be predicated upon the circumstances of the situation. All of these units must operate in a domestic civil environment, which will require equipment and techniques peculiar to that environment.

The aviation brigade has three rotary wing lift battalions and a fixed wing battalion of small passenger and cargo aircraft. Each lift battalion posses three companies of utility helicopters and one company of heavy lift cargo helicopters. The air ambulance companies are assigned to lift battalions to facilitate aviation training and maintenance.

The fixed wing aviation battalion will have two companies of small passenger aircraft to support the division, and three companies of small cargo aircraft to support the three maneuver brigades. As with the maneuver brigades, aviation units must be appropriately trained to operate in a civil environment under any WMD circumstance. The lift battalions and cargo companies will be organized to coincide with their habitual association brigade.

HLD DISCOM and Separate Units



The DISCOM will provide logistic support for the maneuver and aviation brigades. The FSBs will provide their doctrinal functions, organized to meet the logistics needs of MP, heavy engineer, and chemical battalions. One MSB will be dedicated for division support, and one MSB will be dedicated for each maneuver brigade. The MSBs each contain those other capabilities, except mass medical care, required by the brigades for a comprehensive CQM response.

The medical brigade has three MRI hospitals, each with two bed companies. The medical augmentation and other supporting companies encompass all the medical capabilities identified as requirements in Chapter III. Although each MRI hospital will be organized and affiliated with a maneuver brigade, they must be trained and prepared to reinforce one another regionally and nationally. WMD/NBC medical skills and equipment must be incorporated throughout the brigade. The medical brigade must also

be capable of providing planning assistance and expert advice for both WMD related injuries and mass casualty care.

The division will have two signal battalions. One battalion will be dedicated to support internal division operations and all liaison cells. The other battalion will be organized and equipped to provide emergency support to civil authorities for the restoration of vital communications. The NBC reconnaissance battalion will have the MSD elements assigned as subordinate units to ensure standardization, consistency in operations, and facilitate MSD-division coordinated actions. The MI battalion will be trained and organized specifically to support CQM response only, consistent with standing intelligence oversight requirements.

Actions Required for Successful Implementation

DoD is prohibited from organizing and maintaining capabilities designed for domestic employment. As such, DoD must specifically task the National Guard and Army to establish HLD divisions. Moreover, a tasking that translates into organization, equipment, and training is required to ensure the HLD division will be appropriately funded.

A regional EMAC oriented on HLD divisions is essential to enable genuine regional coverage and rapid action short of federal involvement. EMACs are politically sensitive, hence HDL EMACs should be limited to the divisions, other mutual assistance compacts notwithstanding. These high utility forces and the capability force structure distribution provide the leverage to ensure state “buy in” to the EMAC.

Sound organization for National Guard combat, CS and CSS formations must be maintained while determining HLD unit distribution. The distributed capability force structure objective must be attained in concert with the National Guard's organization for its larger wartime role as the Army's primary combat reserve.

The federal government must follow direction with specific funding provisions beyond that necessary for the establishment of the divisions. Although legislation exists to provide federal funding for state use of the Guard under certain circumstances, there are restrictions and limits to the reimbursement. The division must be able to act without reluctance to any situation, or presumed incident, involving WMD. Congress must provide automatic funding for division activation.

V. Benefits, Conclusions and Recommendations

Benefits

Establishing HLD divisions present several important benefits. Units and capabilities specifically organized, trained and equipped will be established and dedicated to the CQM mission. Although DoD cannot be the entire WMD response, HLD divisions will provide an adequate set of base capabilities that simply cannot be maintained within civil agencies. HLD divisions will provide valuable redundancy to ensure national coverage and support for theater commanders in the event of national mobilization. HLD divisions will have the expertise needed to advise and train associated civil agencies, ensuring a comprehensive regional WMD response.

The establishment of HLD divisions can attain the long standing National Guard goal of distributed capability force structure.⁴⁷ This will enable each state to have access to the capabilities considered most necessary for normal disaster relief under Title 32 provisions, if the HLD division units are dispersed in concert with non-HLD units.

Lastly, this will remove the continental US Armies from domestic response operations. This will allow them undistracted concentration on their primary missions of readiness and mobilization.

Conclusions

WMD attack is a valid threat; CQM is a valid mission tasking. DoD's current CQM capabilities are limited and provided on the margins of the Armed Forces. The WMD threat is complex and the consequences of an incident are potentially staggering, requiring a more comprehensive and dedicated commitment of resources.

The National Guard, despite DoD pronouncements, does not now have the ability to assume this mission in the manner required. Beyond the MSD elements, the skills and capabilities most needed in a WMD attack are simply not in the structure in sufficient quantity, and those available are not organized in a manner that will ensure adequate national coverage. Utility is based on capability; it is capability that will matter in WMD homeland defense. At present, the National Guard is only marginally useful for WMD homeland defense.

The National Guard, however, is the right choice for WMD homeland defense. Its community base, infrastructure, and natural affiliation with state and local agencies and authorities, offers an unmatched foundation for CQM. Conversion of two National Guard combat divisions to homeland defense divisions can be done without adverse impact on the Guard's wartime requirements.

The key to the HLD division is the Guard's familiarity and habitual association with civil agencies and resident infrastructure. They can ensure mutual support and full integration of Guard resources with state and local civil authorities, and between each STARC and the FEMA headquarters in the region. The division can also provide extensive and detailed planning and preparation, and a rapid, comprehensive response to a WMD attack. National Guard divisions organized to provide comprehensive WMD homeland defense offer increased utility across the spectrum of domestic needs and additional critical capabilities for major theater war.

Recommendations

DoD should specifically task the National Guard with the WMD homeland defense mission. This should include both preparedness of first responders and civil authorities, and response to WMD attack.

The Army National Guard should reorganize the two combat divisions not apportioned for standing war plans into two Homeland Defense Divisions. Divisions should be organized regionally to coincide with, and replace, the present 1st and 5th Army response task forces.

HLD division organization should be done in concert with other National Guard units to ensure a distributed capability force structure throughout the 54 states and territories.

A regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact should be established, limited to the HLD divisions, to facilitate division support to associated states during emergencies without the necessity of federal involvement.

Federal funding provisions should be established to ensure all WMD responses are federally funded upon activation of the division.

ENDNOTES

¹The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (October 1998), 19.

²The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy* (October 1997), Executive Summary, 4-5.

³Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (May 1997), Sect. II, pp. 2,3 and Department of Defense, Report of the National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense", *National Security in the 21st Century* (December 1997), 11,12.

⁴Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board, 1997 Summer Study Task Force, *DoD Responses To Transnational Threats*, (October 1997), Vol. I, chap. 2, pg. 16.

⁵National Defense Panel, 26.

⁶Center for Army Analysis, Homeland Defense Initiative Response 99 Issues Workshop (24-25 February 99) Workbook, Tab 11.

⁷National Defense Panel, 55.

⁸Quadrennial Defense Review.

⁹DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* (MSCA), (January 15, 1993). MSCA designates the National Guard as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief.

¹⁰Public Law 93-288, as amended, known as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act, is the basis for federal government support in disaster relief.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), *The Federal Response Plan* (FRP), April 1992, Basic Plan.

¹³Stafford Act.

¹⁴FEMA, Report to the President, *An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management Capabilities for Responding to Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Terrorism* (February 1997).

¹⁵Ibid., 14.

¹⁶Public Law 104-201 *National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1997*, Title 14 (14 USC) Sect. 1411-1414 (September 23, 1996).

¹⁷National Defense Panel, 55.

¹⁸14 USC Sect 1402.

¹⁹14 USC Sect 1411-1414.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹US Army Forces Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Homeland Defense Briefing, Center for Army Analysis, Homeland Defense Initiative Response 99 Issues Workshop (24-25 February 99) Workbook, Tab 8.

²²Department of Defense, *Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction* (RC Integration Plan) (January 1998), 16.

²³US Army Forces Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Homeland Defense Briefing, Center for Army Analysis, Homeland Defense Initiative Response 99 Issues Workshop (24-25 February 99) Workbook, Tab 8.

²⁴RC Integration Plan (January 1998), 13.

²⁵Ibid., 16-18.

²⁶FEMA, Report to the President, Letter of Transmittal.

²⁷RC Integration Plan.

²⁸Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Army Requirements Determination and Mission Task Organized Forces*, Council of Colonels Brief (12 August 1998).

²⁹Science Applications International Corporation, National Guard Bureau Report to Congress, *Study on Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism*.

³⁰RC Integration Plan, v, vi.

³¹Ibid., Chap. 4.

³²Brown, Roger A; Fedorochko, William, Jr.; Schank, John F., RAND Corporation, *Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard*, pg. xi.

³³Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration for the U.S. Congress and Federal Emergency Management Administration , *The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response* (January 1997), 85.

³⁴Johnson, Neil, LTC, ARNG, Force Structure Analyst, Force Design Directorate, Training and Doctrine Command, Christmas, William, MAJ, ARNG, ARNG Liaison Force Integration Officer, Standardization, Analysis and Integration Division, Requirements Documentation Directorate, US Army Force Management Agency, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, interviewed by author (20 April, 1999).

³⁵RC Integration Plan, 10-12.

³⁶US Army Forces Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Homeland Defense Briefing, Center for Army Analysis, Homeland Defense Initiative Response 99 Issues Workshop (24-25 February 99) workbook, Tab 8.

³⁷ US Army Forces Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Homeland Defense, WMD Briefing and Subordinate Unit Briefings (TEU, 52d EOD) [homepage on-line] available from <http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/dcsops.html> accessed April 9, 1999.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Science Applications International Corporation, Sect. 9.

⁴⁰Science Applications International Corporation, Sect. 1.8.

⁴¹Brown, Roger A, 37, 65.

⁴²Ibid., 25.

⁴³National Academy of Public Administration, 39, 82.

⁴⁴Science Applications International Corporation, Sect. 1.8.

⁴⁵Stewart, Michael J., CAPT, ARNG, Plans and Operations (AAR), National Guard Bureau, e-mail (19 February 1999).

⁴⁶DoD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, the DCO is required under DoD directives to coordinate all DoD support.

⁴⁷ Johnson, Neil, LTC, ARNG, Force Structure Analyst, Force Design Directorate, Training and Doctrine Command, Christmas, William, MAJ, ARNG, ARNG Liaison Force Integration Officer, Standardization, Analysis and Integration Division, Requirements Documentation Directorate, US Army Force Management Agency, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, interviewed (20 April, 1999).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Publications

The White House, White Paper, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*: Presidential Decision Directive - 56 (May 1997).

The White House, White Paper, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Combating Terrorism*: Presidential Decision Directive - 62 (22 May 1998).

The White House, White Paper, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection*: Presidential Decision Directive - 63 (May 1998).

The White House, *A National Security for a New Century* (October 1998).

US Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (May 1997).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy* (October 1997).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Undated).

Department of Defense, Report of the National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense," *National Security in the 21st Century*, (December, 1997).

Department of Defense, *Bottom Up Review* (1993).

Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program* (September, 15, 1996).

Department of Defense Directive 3020.26, *Continuity Of Operations, Policy and Planning* (May 26, 1995).

Department of Defense Directive 3020.36, *Assignment of National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD Components* (November 2, 1988).

Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* (January 15, 1993).

Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances* (February 4, 1994).

Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities* (February 18, 1997).

Department of Defense Directive 5160.4, *Critical Asset Assurance Program* (January 20, 1998).

Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, *Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials* (January 15, 1986).

Department of Defense Manual 3025.1-M, *Manual For Civil Emergencies* (June 1994).

Department of Defense, *Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions* (1995).

Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board, 1997 Summer Study Task Force, *DoD Responses To Transnational Threats*, (October 1997), Vol. I.

Department of Defense, *Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (January 1998).

Conference Report 105-206, *Chemical and Biological Defense Program*.

House Resolution 2266.

Public Law 104-201 Title XIV “*Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction*”.

Public Law 93-288, as amended Title XIV “*The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act*”.

10 United States Code, Sect. 371-378 modified 18 USC, Sect. 1385.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, *The Federal Response Plan* (April 1992).

Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Report To The President, *An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management Capabilities for Response to NBC Terrorism* (February 1997).

Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration for the U.S. Congress and Federal Emergency Management Administration , *The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response*, (January 1997).

Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (October 1997).

The Joint Warfighting Center, *Concept for Future Joint Operations, expanding Joint Vision 2010* (May 1997).

Department of the Army, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1997* (Undated).

Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Army Requirements Determination and Mission Task Organized Forces*, Council of Colonels Brief (12 August 1998).

Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-SSW), Information Paper, *Homeland Defense* (17 December 1999).

Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Briefing: *Homeland Defense* (Undated).

The National Guard Bureau, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau Fiscal year 1996* (Undated).

The National Guard Bureau Briefing, *The National Guard in Support of State, Local and Federal Authorities, Weapons of Mass Destruction*, [homepage on-line] available from <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil>.

National Guard Bureau Briefing: *Spectrum of Conflict*, [homepage on-line] available from <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil>.

National Guard Bureau Briefing: *Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020, Homeland Defense*, [homepage on-line] available from <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil>.

The Director, Army National Guard, *Army National Guard Posture Statement Fiscal year 1997* (Undated).

The Director, Army National Guard, *Army National Guard Vision 2010* (Undated).

US Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Draft White Paper, *Support for Homeland Defense* (Undated).

US Army Forces Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Briefing for Army Reserve Participation in the Response Task Forces (Undated).

Publication, Army National Guard, *Roles, Missions and Operations*, (Undated).

Reserve Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs Fiscal year 1995* (March 1996).

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The National Guard: Defend the Nation and States* (April 1993).

General Accounting Office *Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly* (March 14, 1996).

General Accounting Office "DoD Reserve Components" *Issues Pertaining to Readiness* (March 21, 1996).

General Accounting Office "Army National Guard" *Planned Conversions Are a Positive Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain* (January 29, 1997).

Science Applications International Corporation, National Guard Bureau Report to Congress, *Study on Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism*.

Southern Governor's Association, *The Emergency Management Assistance Compact Guidebook and Standing Operating Procedures, 1997*, Washington, DC (July 1997).

Miscellaneous

President's FY98 Budget Includes \$1 Million to Study Implementation of the ARNG Division Redesign, March 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct. Online. <October 18, 1997>.

Brehm, Philip A., *Restructuring The Army: The Road To A Total Force*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (February 21, 1992).

Brehm, Philip A. & Gray, Wilbur E., *Alternative Missions for the Army*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (Undated).

Brown, Roger A.; Fedoroch, William Jr.; Schrank, John F., *Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard*, RAND Corporation 1995.

Center for Army Analysis Homeland Defense Initiative Workshop (February 24-25, 1999).

Cohen, William S, Speech to the National Press Club, *Threat Posed to America by WMD* (March 17, 1998).

Henely, Ronald R., *Expanded Emergency Management Roles and the Mission for the National Guard*, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (March 2, 1997).

Inside Washington, "Cohen Endorses Use of the National Guard in Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attack" (February 9, 1998).

Lujan, Thomas R., *Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College*: Carlisle Barracks, PA (Autumn 1997).

Majauskas, Richard R., *Can the Army Expand Its Role in the Domestic Counterdrug Fight*, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (June 1, 1992).

Marsh, Robert T., *The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection*, Keynote address to the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, Baltimore MD (October 7, 1997).

Mercier, Charles L., *Terrorists, WMD and the US Army Reserve*, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (Autumn 1997).

Navaras, William, *A Force In Transition*, National Guard April 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct. Online. <October 18, 1997>.

O'Connell, Thomas W.; Kelly, Ralph B., *State Vulnerability Assessment*, Naval War College, Newport RI (May 1986).

Peay, Binford *The Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement*, Army Magazine (November, 1994).

Philbin, Edward J., *If it ain't broke, don't fix it*, National Guard February 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct. Online. <October 18, 1997>.

Pickering, Isaac D., *Enhancing the Strategic Roles of the National Guard in Domestic Support Operations*, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (March 2, 1997).

Seiple, Chris, *Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (Autumn 1997).

Shcrader, John Y., *The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Support*, RAND Corporation (1993).

Stienweg, Kenneth, et. al, *Weapons of Mass destruction, Title 10 Implications for the Military*, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (August, 1994).

The Atlanta Constitution (1 November, 1995).

Personal Interviews

Bahram, Brian D., LTC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-SSW), Interview (February 25, 1999) and various telephone and e-mail conversations (October 1998-April 1999).

Brown, Jerry P., LTC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-SSW), Interview (February 25, 1999).

Burton, Todd R., CAPT, ARNG, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Force Integration Officer, Consequence Management Program Integration Office, Various telephone and e-mail conversations (October 1997- April 1999).

Christmas, William, MAJ, ARNG, ARNG Liaison Force Integration Officer, Standardization, Analysis and Integration Division, Requirements Documentation Directorate, US Army Force Management Agency, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Various interviews and e-mail conversations (April-May 1999).

Grablin, Mark A., LTC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, E-mail (October, 19, 1998).

Johnson, Niel, LTC, ARNG, Force Structure Analyst, Force Design Directorate, Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Various interviews and e-mail conversations (April-May 1999).

Myers, James B., LTC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, E-mail (2 October, 1998).

Radcliffe, Robert W., LTC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, E-mail (February 16, 1999).

Riggs, Edward M., MAJ, ARNG; Visit to Missouri STARC, Jefferson City, MO (January 27, 1998).

Rinaldo, Richard J., Military Analyst, Headquarters, US Army, Training and Doctrine Command (ATDO-A), Various e-mails (April 1998-April 1999).

Stewart, Micheal J., CAPT, ARNG, Plans and Operations (AAR), National Guard Bureau, Various e-mails (October 1997-April 1999).

Todd, Robert C, LTC, Head, Domestic Plans Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army Forces Command, Interview (April 7, 1999) and various e-mails (January -April 1999).

Thomas, Dutch, LTC, ARNG, Liaison to MCSA/DOMS, Army Operations, National Guard Readiness Center: Various telephone and e-mail conversations (October 1997-April 1999).

Wakeman, James H., COL, ARNG; Visit to Missouri STARC, Jefferson City, MO (January 27, 1998).